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Abstract
This study analyzessome social economic aspects of informal activities using case
study of flea markets in Bandung Municipality. The objectives are to provide a
description of the information we collected during ourfield survey, and report our
findings on the Willingness to Pay (WTP) of people who are doing informal
business in the flea markets under study on some services. We use Censored
Regression Model to estimate WTP for some relevant services (general user
charge, waste disposal services, security, and congestion) in the flea market. We
found two important determinants of WTP, which are the amount of working
capital, and the ownership of the merchandise.
Keywords: flea market, informal activity, WTP
1. Introduction
In the context of economic development, issues related to activities in the informal
sector has always been on a public debate (ILO (2000), Blackman, Newbold, and
Cook (2000), Schneider and Enste (2000), Angelini and Hirose (2004)).
Increasing informal activities are associated with social pressures in urban areas.
The social pressures are driven, among others, by population growth (both
naturaly or from migration) which in turn increases the supply of labour
excessively.
Growth in urban labour force, unfortunately, is not accompanied by an adequate
increase of employment. For Indonesian case, this situation has been exacerbated
by decreasing employment elasticity of economic growth over time. Without any
proper policy responses, the resulting unemployment may lead to more severe
1 Presented at IRSA 1
st International Institute 2007, Bandung Institute of Technology, 1-3
November 2007. This is a preliminary result, please do not quote without permission.
2 We would like to thank UNPAD Research Institute for the financial support in this research,
Megananda and Achmad Maulana for organizing the Survey and data tabulation, and Arief
Anshory Yusuf for the english editing. Usual disclaimer applies.2
social problems such as security, waste, traffic, and other socio-economic and
environmental problems. What is obvious is that increasing informal activities
have been the natural consequences of this development.
This study aims to analyze some socio-economic aspects of informal activities
using case study of flea markets in Bandung Municipality. This paper is part of
that bigger study, and some results reported here are tentative.
According to Van Den berg (2001), informal activity is an attempt to carry out
mutually beneficial transactions despite rules, laws, or other institutions that
restrict them. In effect, informal activity is rent-evading activity. The results of
rent-evading activity depend on the institutions, or incentives, that establish the
relative costs and benefits of engaging in formal and informal activity, in other
wordsinformal activity is making the best of bad institutions.
In this paper, the objectives are to provide a description of the information we
collected during our field survey, and report our findings on the Willingness to
Pay (WTP) of people who are doing informal business in the flea markets under
study on some services such as security, waste disposal, and general services (user
charges). We also question the WTP to compensate the cost of congestion, which
usually happens during the activities of the flea markets.
It is expected that the result of this study can be used for better policy formulation
carried out by local government in regulating informal activities. In addition, by
knowing the WTP of the informal sellers and street vendors to pay for some
relevant services, the government will have better information related to potential
revenue raised from informal activities.
2. Methodology and Data
The WTP calculation is inferred form the response of the respondents on the
questioner that is already structured. The questions are on the willingness to pay
for some services in question and their socio-economic characteristics. The WTP
is analysed using descriptive analysis and econometrics. On the econometrics,
censored regression is used in an attempt to explain the determinants of the WTP,
because a sample in which information on the regressand is available only for













* i ' 0 (if the respondent is willing to pay )









i = Variables that determine the WTP
WTP* is censored at WTP=0 we will call this kind of response variable a corner
solution outcome (Woodridge,2002). Based on the above definition, WTP will be
greater than zero if the respondent is willing to pay, and will have a zero value if
he/she is not willing to pay. The possibility of this kind of responses call for
censored regressions.
Figure 1 represents the analytical framework in our study to analyze some social




Population and Labor Force Condition in Bandung Municipality
Year Population
Working






2002 2,142,194 1,842,051 940,491 835,992 104,499 11.11
2003 2,228,268 1,859,674 981,008 841,786 139,222 14.19
2004 2,232,624 1,890,108 1,012,176 869,022 143,154 14.14






































2001 15,235 2,851 891 5.85
2002 19,554 2,294 947 4.84
2003 15,732 1,879 1,419 9.02
2004 42,275 2,218 2,211 5.23
2005 29,190 1,548 1,429 4.90
Source: Bandung in Figure, 2005
Table 1 and table 2 represent more or less the situation represented in figure 1.
Population pressures eventually led to a higher rate of open unemployment. This
condition is worsened by the inability of the formal sector to absorb the available
labor force (as can be seen from the low ratio of the job seekers placements to
registration). These situations (the low labor absorption and low employment
elasticity of formal sector) indicate the existence of transfer of labor from formal
to informal sector. This transfer explains the increasing level of informal activities
in BandungMunicipality.
According to 2006 regional labor force survey (SUSEDA), 38% of employed
labor force in Bandung Municipality work in the informal sector (table 3). This
situation clearly indicates the importance of the informal sector in absorbing labor
force. The situation provides relevance to any study that attempts to measure the
economic value of informal activities. The knowledge of this aspect is of strategic
value in the process of urban development planning.6
Table 3
Working Population above 10 Years Age by Age
and Main Employment Status in Bandung Municipality, 2006.
Employment status
Age











(a) (b) I (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
10-14 - - - 1,582 - 1,582 - - 1,582
15-19 2,206 - 764 24,347 2,579 25,111 4,785 16 29,896
20-24 12,321 1,192 360 77,841 4,150 78,201 17,663 18 95,864
25-29 19,488 4,046 3,609 84,714 5,589 88,323 29,123 25 117,446
30-34 27,970 9,215 3,294 74,087 4,215 77,381 41,400 35 118,781
35-39 40,969 11,430 4,106 63,531 3,959 67,637 56,358 45 123,995
40-44 31,785 13,083 6,714 55,606 4,160 62,320 49,028 44 111,348
45-49 30,667 7,995 5,703 48,261 4,023 53,964 42,685 44 96,649
50-54 22,763 7,423 4,304 38,997 3,114 43,301 33,300 43 76,601
55-59 12,044 3,708 2,649 14,141 1,899 16,790 17,651 51 34,441
60-64 8,880 3,746 1,826 5,008 1,548 6,834 14,174 67 21,008
65-69 4,362 1,036 472 2,014 488 2,486 5,886 70 8,372
70-74 3,200 1,305 632 1,783 - 2,415 4,505 65 6,920
75+ 1,344 206 586 877 197 1,463 1,747 54 3,210
Total 217,999 64,385 35,019 492,789 35,921 527,808 318,305 38 846,113
Note: 1. Self employed
2. Self employed assisted by unpaid labor
3. Self employed assisted by paid labor
4. Formal workers (salary earning)
5. Unpaid workers
Source: Regional Labor Force Survey, 2006
Respondent’s Characteristics
In this study, a total of 1,401 respondents are selected from some important area
of flea markets in Bandung Municipality. That is, Gasibu (Diponegoro-Surapati
street), Metro (Sukarno-Hatta Street), Pasteur (Dr. Junjunan Street), Pusdai
(Supratman Street), Salman (Ganesha Street), and Samsat (Sukarno-Hatta Street).
The composition of the sample can be seen from Table 4.7
Table 4.











From the sample collected, we describe some important aspects of their
characteristic as follows.
Education
The average years of schooling in the sample are 10.39 years, which is more or
less equivalent to a senior high school. There are minor variations across the sites
of the flea market. In general, however, we can say that sellers in the flea markets
of Bandung Municipality has relatively a high degree of education (at least junior
high school).
Age
We also found that the average age of the sellers is 33.8 years old, which falls in a
productive age group. This indicates that doing business in the flea markets is a
source of employment for urban productive population whocannot be absorbed in
the formal sector.
Household Size
Household size or number of family members indicates the economic burden of
the seller. Data from the sample collected suggests that, on average, sellers in the
flea market have to support two family members (excluding himself). There are
only minor variations across the site of the flea markets. In other words, most of
the sellers are new family, which consists of one spouse and one child.8
Table 5.
Respondent’s Demographic Characteristics of the Flea Market by Location






(All) 10.39 1.97 33.78
Gasibu 10.44 1.81 33.75
Metro 10.85 1.92 32.17
Pasteur 9.52 2.07 34.40
Pusdai 10.62 1.96 33.64
Salman 10.78 2.18 33.05
Samsat 10.16 2.20 34.97
Source: author calculation
Business Profile
The information on business profile consists of information on sales, working
capital, and cost (or expenditure). The average sale of sample businesses in the
flea market is Rp. 318,886. Out of the 6 flea market under study, businesses in the
Metro area have the highest sales (Rp. 549,339) and that in Pasteur area has the
smallest sales (Rp. 120,485).
Another indicator is working capital. The average working capital is Rp.
1,713,467. In general, the working capital is used for more than one activity. A
seller in Metro area has the higher working capital (more than 3 million rupiahs),
and a seller in Pasteur area has the smallest working capital.
Average monthly business expenditure of the sample is Rp. 1,076,445. Out of the
6 location, sellers at Pusdai have the highest expenditure while sellers at Pasteur
have the lowest expenditure.9
Figure 2.















Sales Working Capital Expenditure
Source: author calculation
3. Informal Services and their WTP
In this paper, we focus on finding out the willingness to pay of sellers on some
services they need to pay when doing their activities (except the one related to




4) Compensating for traffic congestion created by the flea market
Only item 3 (user charge) is formally incurred by the sellers.
User charge is the fee paid by the sellers to local government for using the area to
sell their merchandise. The fee is formally collected by the local government.
Waste disposal is charged unofficially by local communities in the area
surrounding the market. Most of the time, paying this fee to them does not
guarantee the service they promised. Security moreover, is paid to some people
that claim that they can take care of the security in the area. Mostly they are just
some “preman”, i.e. unemployed people who ask for money by force, otherwise
their security is not guaranteed (criminal threat).
Based on the non-parametric analysis conducted, it is suggested that there are
different characteristics among different location of flea market (Appendix table-
A1). We used this as a basis to analyze the WTP differenceacross location.10
We use censored regression to analyze the determinants of WTPs, and use GLM
standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. We impose the GLM condition
that the (true) variance of yi is proportional to the variance of the distribution used
to specify the log likelihood. Tabel-6 shows the average WTP for the 4 items,
while tables A2 to A7 in the appendix show similar analysis for each location
individually.
For the overall locations we surveyed, there are two main determinants of WTP
(for any of the 4 items) i.e., working capital and the type of the stock of
merchandise the seller own. In general, the amount of working capital and sellers’
ownership of the merchandise stocks have a positive impact on their willingness
to pay for the services.
When we divide the sample into locations, it turns out that that the above strong
relationship does not hold anymore. That is, the relationship between working
capital and the stock ownership become less significant in determining the sellers
WTP. It may be the case that there are some unobserved location specific
variables that is not captured by the model.
Tabel 6
ML_Censored Normal with GLM Standard Errors (prob. in parenthesis):
for All Location






















































Log likelihood -9946.267 -5826.655 -10364.23 -10836.11
Left censored obs 203 757 120 183
Total obs 1401 1401 1401 1401
Average WTP 903.033 356.4954 807.173 1342.898
Average Actual Pay 1842.539 1277.620 863.435 952.566
Source: Author’s calculation based on Survey11
The survey also suggests that, except for WTP for general user charge, the
average WTP and the actual amount that the sellers pay are different. Of those
services where the actual pay is higher than their WTP, there is an indication that
there are some other unofficial costs incurred to the sellers. The money goes to
informal institutions other than local government. This is a clear indication that
formal institutions have not done their job very well, so that the revenue potentials
are captured by informal institutions.
Another possible explanation for this is that sellers’ willingness to pay may be
higher if the rule of law can be enforced. If the government wants to get more
revenues from informal activities, it needs to give people who are involved in
informal activities more certainty, protection, and proper services. The revenue
the government gets can be used to finance activities to reduce the externalities
created by the presence of the flea markets.
4. Concluding Remarks
We conduct a survey of 1,401 sellers at 6 different locations of flea markets,
which represent important activities of the informal sectors, in Bandung
municipality. The demographic profile of the sellers, for example, they are mostly
at their productive working age, relatively highly educated, and small family size,
may confirm that informal activities in general, and flea markets in particular, are
an alternative place to work for the new labor force who cannot be absorbed by
the formal sector.
We found two important determinants of WTP for some relevant services (general
user charge, waste disposal services, security, and congestion) in the flea market;
the amount of working capital, and the ownership of the merchandise. Both of
these factors affect sellers WTP for the relevant services positively.
There are potentials for the government to collect revenues from the informal
activities at the flea market. However, the local government needs to providewhat
the sellers need, among others, reducing the unofficial costs that the sellers pay,
and providing what is needed by the sellers. When the government, at this stage of
development, cannot remove or reduce the informal activities, it would be more
efficient and equitable to accommodate the informal activities.12
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Compare Mean for n-Sample Test Kruskal-Wallis Test:
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Expenditure
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 1000000 730.6 2.20
2 208 1000000 748.7 1.84
3 134 850000 633.2 -2.04
4 120 1000000 742.5 1.17
5 92 950000 679.7 -0.52
6 296 850000 632.9 -3.26
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 19.49 DF = 5 P = 0.002
H = 19.75 DF = 5 P = 0.001 (adjusted for ties)
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Sales
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 150000 695.6 -0.40
2 208 400000 923.0 8.58
3 134 100000 397.8 -9.12
4 120 200000 736.9 1.02
5 92 187500 696.0 -0.12
6 296 192000 679.2 -1.04
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 139.82 DF = 5 P = 0.000
H = 140.66 DF = 5 P = 0.000 (adjusted for ties)
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Education
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 12.000 711.2 0.76
2 208 12.000 768.8 2.62
3 134 9.000 569.1 -3.97
4 120 12.000 731.6 0.87
5 92 12.000 756.1 1.35
6 296 12.000 664.6 -1.74
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 25.22 DF = 5 P = 0.000
H = 30.00 DF = 5 P = 0.000 (adjusted for ties)14
Kruskal-Wallis Test on WTP Waste Disposal
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 1000.0 733.4 2.42
2 208 1000.0 932.6 8.95
3 134 500.0 572.0 -3.88
4 120 1000.0 778.1 2.18
5 92 500.0 633.3 -1.66
6 296 500.0 526.1 -8.38
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 147.57 DF = 5 P = 0.000
H = 173.77 DF = 5 P = 0.000 (adjusted for ties)
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Charge
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 1000 703.0 0.15
2 208 1000 838.1 5.30
3 134 1000 618.3 -2.49
4 120 1500 828.8 3.62
5 92 1000 688.6 -0.30
6 296 1000 590.4 -5.30
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 63.68 DF = 5 P = 0.000
H = 67.86 DF = 5 P = 0.000 (adjusted for ties)
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Congestion
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 0.000000000 732.1 2.31
2 208 0.000000000 632.0 -2.66
3 134 0.000000000 598.4 -3.09
4 120 5.00000E+02 831.4 3.69
5 92 0.000000000 715.5 0.36
6 296 0.000000000 680.7 -0.97
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 31.25 DF = 5 P = 0.000
H = 38.12 DF = 5 P = 0.000 (adjusted for ties)
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Security
coding_exp N Median Ave Rank Z
1 551 1000.0 722.3 1.59
2 208 1000.0 858.8 6.10
3 134 500.0 536.4 -4.95
4 120 1000.0 764.2 1.79
5 92 1000.0 720.3 0.47
6 296 1000.0 593.4 -5.15
Overall 1401 701.0
H = 79.44 DF = 5 P = 0.000
H = 95.97 DF = 5 P = 0.000 (adjusted for ties)15
Tabel-A2
ML_Censored Normal with GLM Standard Errors (prob in parenthesis) (prob in
parenthesis) in Gasibu



















































Log likelihood -3834.251 -2383.817 -3981.856 -4192.362
Left censored obs 86 286 64 95
Total obs 551 551 551 551
Average WTP 899.8185 395.6443 810.2541 1464.428
Average Actual Pay 2126.887 1366.359 907.767 1131.788
Tabel-A3
ML_Censored Normal with GLM Standard Errors (prob in parenthesis) in Soekarno-Hatta





















































Log likelihood -1906.556 -1225.551 -1990.451 -2086.786
Left censored obs 57 154 33 44
Total obs 296 296 296 296
Average WTP 698.3108 294.2568 582.7703 944.9324
Average Actual Pay 1536.149 1042.553 833.3333 805.936116
Tabel-A4
ML_Censored Normal with GLM Standard Errors (prob in parenthesis) in Metro



















































Log likelihood -1552.815 -670.2876 -1593.139 -1597.914
Left censored obs 25 136 19 29
Total obs 208 208 208 208
Average WTP 1203.846 269.2308 1199.519 1721.154
Average Actual Pay 1836.634 1162.5 758.9286 910.7143
Tabel-A5
ML_Censored Normal with GLM Standard Errors (prob in parenthesis) in Pasteur





















































Log likelihood -903.1890 -452.5417 -905.9355 -979.6807
Left censored obs 8 82 0 1
Total obs 134 134 134 134
Average WTP 664.1791 211.194 629.1045 950
Average Actual Pay 1228.571 968.75 817.6471 783.177617
Tabel-A6
ML_Censored Normal with GLM Standard Errors (prob in parenthesis) in PUSDAI





















































Log likelihood -910.0196 -660.6402 -990.7138 -990.7138
Left censored obs 14 47 6 6
Total obs 120 120 120 120
Average WTP 1162.5 629.5833 925 1691.667
Average Actual Pay 1146.552 833.3333 750 832.3944
Tabel-A7
ML_Censored Normal with QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance (prob in
parenthesis) in Salman





















































Log likelihood -641.3138 -359.8464 -678.0821 -698.0101
Left censored obs 13 52 3 8
Total obs 92 92 92 92
Average WTP 910.3261 375 729.3478 1157.609
Average Actual Pay 2133.333 1722.222 1124.242 685.4839